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REMEMBERING PINE GATE
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD*
This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of Chapter 11.
Before it went into effect, the law governing corporate
reorganizations in the United States was largely dysfunctional.1

Old Chapter X was slow, expensive, and unwieldy. Old Chapter
XI did not allow for the restructuring of secured debt. Chapter XII
for real estate bankruptcies brought its own set of problems. 2 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act 3 set about changing all of this. Now that
we have had twenty-five years of learning, we can ask whether
Chapter 11 has lived up to its expectations and what role, if any, it
is filling.
Today we are focusing on real estate bankruptcies. The
number of real estate bankruptcies has been in decline as of late.
These are the lean years, but there is no reason for gloom. There
is a lot of construction going on. A lot of high yield loans are being
made. Defaults and bankruptcies are just around the corner.
What kind of ride should we expect when we find ourselves in the
next round of real estate bankruptcies?
I. PINE GATE
This morning I start at the beginning and look at where we
were twenty-five years ago when the Bankruptcy Code came into
effect. There have been only a handful of amendments to the Code
that affect real estate bankruptcies. Most of these amendments
have the effect of changing the procedures in a way that is
supposed to make things happen more quickly. Congress, for
" Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished

Service Professor, University of
on
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1. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTcY
LAW IN AMERICA 131-83 (2001).
2. See generally Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy
Reform Act on Real Estate Development and Financing, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J.
363 (1979).
3. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101109 (2000)).
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example, added a set of rules for single-asset real estate cases with
secured debt of less than $4 million that force debtors who do not
produce a plan within ninety days to start paying interest. 4 In the
grand scheme of things, however, not that much has happened.
The Bankruptcy Code itself is now entering a comfortable middle
age and does not seem likely to change.
But the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy practice are two
different things.
The world of real estate bankruptcies has
changed utterly. Even if the text of the Bankruptcy Code remains
a constant, much else is in flux. The judges are different. Tax
rules are different. The economy is different. All of these and
other changes have made 2004 quite different from 1979. How did
we get from there to here?
Let's start at the beginning. Let's go back to the world of
1979. It is a world of leisure suits, Maude, Mork and Mindy, and
the Iranian hostage crisis. Skylab returns to earth and crashes
into the Indian Ocean. How did we think about real estate
bankruptcy then? There is a short answer to this question-Pine
Gate.5 It was the case of the hour. You could not go to a cocktail
party in those days and not have a real estate lender who had been
drinking too much complain about Pine Gate. What was the fuss
about?
We have to go back even farther in time. It is 1973. This is
history. Ancient history. Paul Newman and Robert Redford are
starring in The Sting. Bonanza, Gunsmoke, and Laugh-in are still
on prime time. Secretariat becomes the first horse in twenty-five
years to win the Triple Crown. Two reporters for the Washington
Post are making nuisances of themselves about something called
Watergate. But for one real estate developer, the big news is Pine
Gate.
I am a real estate developer in Georgia. I gather a group of
limited partners to create the Pine Gate Apartments. It is a great
deal. The limited partners, perhaps doctors and dentists, are
facing a fifty percent tax on their earned income and seventy
percent tax on investment income. 6 They need a tax shelter and
Pine Gate is just the ticket. This was before passive investor rules
were put in place.7 They invest a modest amount of money and get
the benefit of accelerated depreciation. They will have to pay it
back if the property is sold, but as long as it isn't, each dollar of

4. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat.
4107, 4119, 4122, 4128, 4132, 4141, 4142, 4144 (adding 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)).
5. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., No. B75-4345A, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17366 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1976) [hereinafter Pine Gate 11.
6. See Top US Marginal Income Tax Rates, 1913-2003, at
http://www.truthandpolitics.org/top-rates.php (last updated Feb. 15, 2004).
7. See 26 U.S.C. § 469 (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 501(a), Pub.
L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2233).
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depreciation is a dollar less of income. The general partner finds
an insurance company to put up $1.45 million to build the
apartments. 8 It is a nonrecourse loan. 9 The doctors and dentists
have the best of both worlds. The insurance company can look
only to the property itself; it can't even come after the general
partner. Life is good.
But a number of things go wrong. First, in building Pine
Gate, I violated the first three rules of real estate investment
(location, location, location). Pine Gate is not close enough to
Atlanta to get the kind of renters that they want-or indeed very
many renters at all. 10 Pine Gate is not going to do well until there
is additional development in the area and it looks like we are
going to have to be very patient."
Our costs of maintaining the property are also rising. Gerald
Ford tries to fight inflation with WIN buttons (short for, "Whip
Inflation Now"), but thinking positive thoughts does not help.
Meanwhile, I cannot raise the rent fast enough and I have to cut
Deferred maintenance makes the
corners on maintenance.
property less attractive and occupancy goes down. 12 Worse yet, to
be really honest, I'm not really that good at running this operation.
By December 1975, it is obvious Pine Gate is not going to be
able to make its payments to the insurance company. I file a
Chapter XII petition. 13 You-the insurance company-try to
persuade the bankruptcy judge to allow you to foreclose on the
property. You point out that Pine Gate as is currently managed is
now worth considerably less than what you are owed. Based on
Pine Gate's sorry current earnings, your experts peg its value at
$850,000.14 Pine Gate is really yours and you should be able to
take it.
As was often the case in those days, this argument goes
nowhere. The judge allows me to use operating revenues to pay
for the deferred maintenance and otherwise put the property in
better shape. 15 In the meantime, I come up with a plan of
reorganization.
This is where you get your biggest surprise. I propose a plan
of reorganization that extinguishes your claim with a cash
payment of $1.2 million. 16 You don't like this. Why is not clear.
Why don't you just take the money and run? Perhaps you offered
8. See Pine Gate I, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *27.
9. See id. at 4.

10. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) at 607,
627 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 1977) [hereinafter Pine Gate II].
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 627, 633-34.
See id. at 626-27.
See Pine Gate I, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *1.
See id. at *58; Pine Gate II, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) at 628.
See Pine Gate II, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) at 614, 614 n.18.
See Pine Gate I, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *58.
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a low-ball valuation when you argued that you should be allowed
to foreclose. Perhaps you just don't like being stripped down.
You decide to fight, but you do it by contesting the valuation.
This is a mistake on your part. Your expert is not able to persuade
the judge that the property is worth more than $1.2 million. After
all, this expert had told the identical judge that Pine Gate was
worth only $850,000 just six months ago. 17 No one feels sorry for
you.
Using the same guy to give two completely different
valuations to the same property within six months in front of the
same judge is like dousing yourself with gasoline and lighting a
match.
But now you have to live with yourself as a human being and
hold your head up along with all of your real estate lending
buddies. Forget about Pine Gate. What is the general principle
that the law has now adopted thanks to you? This is where the
bad news really is. Debtors can keep the property, strip down your
lien, and go on as if the loan had been for $1.2 million, rather than
$1.45 million.
This is ridiculous. If the property is really not worth what
you as the senior lender are owed, you should get it. The debtor
should not be able to snap his fingers and make $250,000 of
principal disappear. Now, thanks to you, real estate debtors can
strip down nonrecourse loans in bankruptcy. The nightmare
scenario for the lender is that whenever the economy goes into a
downturn, every two-bit real estate developer like me will use
bankruptcy to write down debt. When the market comes back, I
will enjoy the upside. If things continue to get worse, you still
bear the downside. Heads I win; tails you lose. The general
principle is enough to make any lender choke on his
Chateaubriand.
In the 1970s, this became known as the "Pine Gate problem."
The people who worried about bankruptcy reform had to worry
about what to do with this case. During the 1970s, special
interests had not yet gotten their claws into bankruptcy reform.' 8

17. Judge Norton in Pine Gate II stated that:
The secured Creditors take the position that the court should appraise
the "cram down" value ... at no less than the full amount now owing...
because Dr. Andrews testified [in November 1976] that assuming 95% or
more occupancy at some point in the future, the project will at that time
have a value approximating or in excess of the current debt .... Such
argument is unacceptable. It is based on speculation and assumptions,
not relevant facts. The testimony of Dr. Andrews, based upon the facts
of the occupancy and earnings record in April 1976, was that the value
of the property is $853,000.
12 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) at 629.
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Philosophy and Design of Modern Fresh
Start Policies and Consumer Proposals: The Changing Politics of American
Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 190-92 (1999).
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Those involved were, to a very large extent, bankruptcy lawyers
and judges, and academics who wanted to get it right. 19 We look
at bankruptcy reform today, and we see a swamp of special
interests and mindless confusion. The 1970s was perhaps the last
time we had to get the law right. In any event, the way in which
they thought about Pine Gate, which is to say the way they
thought about real estate bankruptcy generally, would be with us
for a long time.
The people who wrote the Bankruptcy Code tried to deal with
20
Pine Gate in three ways:
" They made nonrecourse debt recourse in Chapter 11.21
* They gave the secured creditor the right to elect to have its
22
entire claim treated as secured.
* They insisted that real estate lenders get the benefit of the
absolute priority rule and the right to 23get the indubitable
equivalent of the value of their collateral.
19. Id. at 191-92.
20. See 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs. v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. (In re 680 Fifth
Ave. Assocs.), 156 B.R. 726, 730-731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1) provides:
(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed
or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of
such claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim,
whether or not such holder has such recourse, unless
(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least two-thirds
in amount and more than half in number of allowed claims of such
class, application of paragraph (2) of this subsection; or
(ii) such holder does not have such recourse and such property is sold
under section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the plan.
(B) A class of claims may not elect application of paragraph (2) of this
subsection if
(i) the interest on account of such claims of the holders of such claims
in such property is of inconsequential value; or
(ii) the holder of a claim of such class has recourse against the debtor
on account of such claim and such property is sold under section 363
of this title or is to be sold under the plan.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) provides: "If such an election is made, then
notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim to
the extent that such claim is allowed."
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) provides:
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides(i)(1) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest
in such property;
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The drafters believed that these three ideas, working
together, would solve the Pine Gate problem and put real estate
bankruptcies on a sensible course. Let's see if they were right.
Let us start with turning nonrecourse debt into recourse debt.
What is the point of doing this? There is a certain logic here. Let
us assume we have a single-asset real estate case and the
nonrecourse secured lender is owed $100. Miscellaneous twelveyear-old lawn mowers are owed $5. The market has taken a turn
for the worse. If we did not have § 1111(b) to make the debt
recourse, what happens?
The bankruptcy court values the
property at $60. The secured creditor is forced to take a note
secured by the property for $60. The general creditors who are
owed $5 get all the equity of the business. The property is sold a
year later for $90.
How do we divide up the cash, assuming that the nonrecourse
loan remains nonrecourse in bankruptcy? The note the secured
creditor has is only for $60. Thus, the secured creditor gets $60,
and the $30 balance goes to the twelve-year-old lawn mowers.
Allowing the lawn mowers to get this $30 windfall makes no sense.
By making the nonrecourse loan recourse, we fix this problem.
The secured creditor gets a deficiency claim and therefore shares
in the equity with the general creditors. The $30 gained from the
sale goes back primarily to the senior lender, which is where it
should go. This is the logic that undergirds § 1111(b).
But in practice the nonrecourse secured lender does not enjoy
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of
such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and
the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent
of such claims.
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive
or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior claim or interest any property.
(C) With respect to a class of interests(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class
receive or retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of
the effective date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed
amount of any fixed liquidation preference to which such holder is
entitled, any fixed redemption price to which such holder is entitled,
or the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior interest any property.
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this protection. This protection turns crucially on the junior
creditors taking equity in the reorganized venture. Reorganization
plans are not usually structured this way. Instead of equity, the
twelve-year-old gets a side payment (along with an informal
Section 1111(b) does not
promise of continued employment).
provide that much protection here when the bank lends $100 and
the bankruptcy court says the property is worth $60. The dentists
and doctors propose a plan that gives the lawn mowers a token
amount of cash and provides that they retain the equity on
account of new value that they contribute to the reorganized
debtor. Under the plan, the bank gets a note worth $60 for its
secured claim, and its $40 unsecured claim is extinguished for a
few cents on the dollar. When the property is sold a year later for
$90, the entire benefit goes to the dentists and the doctors.
Treating the nonrecourse claim as recourse does not protect
the secured creditors when the property is flipped. As it has
played out over the last twenty-five years, whether foreseen or not,
the ability to transform the nonrecourse claim into a recourse
claim has little substantive value. But it does have value. In
bankruptcy, procedure matters. Possessing a general claim, even
one that is out of the money, improves the negotiating hand of the
bank.
Section 1129(a)(10) requires that at least one impaired class
If we give the nonrecourse creditor a
approve the plan.24
deficiency claim and if this deficiency claim is put in the same
class as the general creditors, then the real estate developer will
not be able to confirm a plan over the bank's objection.
Everything depends on the
But there is a catch here.
recourse claim being in the same class as the other general claims
for voting purposes. This isn't the law in the Seventh Circuit.
Woodbrook tells us that the deficiency claim cannot be put in the
same class as general claims. 25 The deficiency claim does not exist
outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, it does not exist in Chapter 7.
Because it has different legal attributes, it must be in a class by
itself. This defangs the power associated with holding a deficiency
claim. If the debtor can cram down his plan on you as the holder
of the $60 secured claim, it can cram down its plan on you as the
holder of a $40 unsecured claim as well. So much for this response
to Pine Gate, at least in the Seventh Circuit.
What about the second solution to Pine Gate, one that is also
embedded in § 1111(b)? A secured creditor is given the right to
waive its unsecured claim and have its entire claim treated as
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) reads: "If a class of claims is impaired under the
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted
the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any
inside."
25. In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 319 (7th Cir. 1994).
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secured. 26 Much is unknown about the consequences of making
the § 1111(b) election, but identifying what is at stake is not
difficult. Consider again a bank that lends $100 to a real estate
developer. The loan is secured by Blackacre.
How does the election make the creditor better off? If the
election is made, the creditor is deemed to have a secured claim for
the entire amount of the debt, irrespective of the collateral's value.
Thus, in the above example, the bank would have a secured claim
of $100, not $60. The bank does not, however, receive a stream of
payments worth $100.
Under § 1129(b)(2)(a)(i)(II), 27 the bank
would be given a stream of payments with a present value of only
$60. (The section provides that the stream of payments must
equal "the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in
such property." The court has valued the property at $60.)
In this respect, the bank is treated neither better nor worse
than if it had not made the election. By making the election, the
bank gives up its deficiency claim of $40, and in return it receives
the right to a stream of payments with a face amount equal to
$100. Moreover, the stream of payments is secured by a lien of
$100 instead of $60. In many cases, the term of the loan is loig
enough that a note can have a present value of $60 and still have a
stream of payments over $100. In such a case, the § 1111(b)
election benefits a secured creditor only if the court undervalues
the property and there is likely to be either a default in the near
future or a sale that would accelerate the $100 obligation. If this
conjunction of events is not likely, then the election has little value
and again little will have been done to solve the Pine Gate
problem.
If the bankruptcy judge accurately values the property and if
nothing happens to the real estate markets, making the election
gives up whatever leverage you might have as the holder of a
deficiency claim, and you get nothing in return. Even if the debtor
flips the property quickly, you are still going to get only the value
of the property, which is $60.
The election has value only if the judge seriously undervalues
the property. Even here the benefit is modest. If the judge
seriously undervalues the property, the debtor should not have
any problem paying the note which, by assumption, is worth
considerably less than the property. Put all the pieces together
and the election is likely to have value only when two conditions
are met-the bankruptcy judge comes up with a low-ball valuation
and the property is flipped. This happens, but the § 1111(b)
election is not something we see that often.

26. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2).

27. For the relevant portions of § 1129(b)(2), see supra note 23.

Remembering Pine Gate

2004]

II.

THE VALUATION PROBLEM

The big problem here is one that is hard to solve through
statutory language. The basic problem is a valuation problem.
Strip-down is not a big deal in a world in which the secured
creditor gets cash or cash equivalents equal to what it could get in
the event of foreclosure. In such a world, the bankruptcy process
does not leave the nonrecourse real estate lender worse off. The
Pine Gate problem arose because judges were thought not to be
good at making valuations. Moreover, they were not merely bad,
but they were systematically biased in the direction of the debtor.
But what do you do to get the valuations right? This is hard
to legislate. The Supreme Court decided a Chapter 13 case in this
year called Till v. SCS Credit Corp.28 It is a Chapter 13 case
inv 6 lving an individual debtor and his truck. The question was
how the Court should go about setting the appropriate interest
rate. The Court settled on the prime rate, adjusted upward to
take account of the likelihood the debtor would default. 29 It's a
strange 4-1-4 decision, but eight of the nine justices agreed that
you have to set the interest rate in a way that fully accounts for
30
the likelihood of default.
In theory, the starting place should not matter as long as the
judge is adept at setting an interest rate that takes account of the
risk of default. But the facts of Till make plain that the starting
place matters a lot. We live in a world in which seventy percent of
all Chapter 13 debtors fail to complete their plans and nothing
suggests that Till is more likely than average to succeed. It is
hard to believe that 150 basis points above prime is enough to
account for a default risk that is many, many times what one sees
in an ordinary consumer loan, where the default rate is less than
31
ten percent.
Till is a Chapter 13 case. But this is like saying that Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins 32 is just a railroad case. The valuation
principle the Court adopted applies with full force to every case,
including every real estate bankruptcy. This case underscores
what is the crucial issue in real estate bankruptcy-valuations. If
you have a judge who is cold-blooded about valuations and who
uses markets to get a realistic feel for what is going on, then Pine

28. 124 S. Ct. 1951 (2004).
29. Id. at 1961-62 (Stevens, J., plurality).
30. Id. at 1961 (Stevens, J., plurality); id. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 1957 ("The proposed plan also provided that petitioners would
pay interest on the secured portion of respondent's claim at a rate of 9.5% per
year. Petitioners arrived at this 'prime-plus' or 'formula rate' by augmenting
the national prime rate of approximately 8% (applied by banks when making
low-risk loans) to account for the risk of nonpayment posed by borrowers in
their financial position.").
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
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Gate is not a big deal. If you have judges who always have a
thumb on the scale for the debtor, the solutions to Pine Gate in the
Bankruptcy Code-and frankly any other solutions you might
devise-are not going to get you anywhere.
This brings me to my main theme.
You really cannot
understand real estate bankruptcy, or the future of real estate
bankruptcy, unless you have your pulse on the state of bankruptcy
law today. There have been dramatic changes in bankruptcy
practice since the time of Pine Gate and the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code. These have accelerated over the last ten years.
When we have the next upsurge in real estate bankruptcies-as
we surely will-the changes we have seen elsewhere in bankruptcy
will come powerfully home in real estate bankruptcies and give
you a dynamic utterly different from what you saw during the
1970s, '80s, and early '90s. But I am getting ahead of myself.
What kinds of changes have we seen? How are bankruptcy judges
going to understand Till?
III. THE NEW FACE OF CHAPTER 11
What does the world of Chapter 11 look like outside the real
estate context?
Boosters of Chapter 11 often talk as if the
financially troubled and businesses in Chapter 11 were one and
the same. Nothing could be further from the truth. More than a
million businesses shut their doors each year in the United
States.33 Many more encounter financial distress. Of these, only
10,000 file for Chapter 11. The vast majority of these cases
involve small businesses. We have dry wall subcontractors, momand-pop restaurants, small jewelry and clothing stores, and travel
agents. Each of these businesses has only a few employees, and
turnover of employees in these firms tends to be high. 34
Chapter 11 brings only modest benefits in these cases. The
principal value of preserving such small firms is that it allows
their owners to continue to enjoy the psychic benefit of running
their own business. But the costs are small too. We do not see the
owners of small businesses in hopeless condition use Chapter 11 to
drag out the inevitable for very long. The creditors and the United
States Trustee control the process. The failed businesses that last
the longest are usually the ones where there is the most
uncertainty about the debtor's prospects. In some cases, the
33. For U.S. Department of Labor Statistics on employment dynamics, see
http://data.bls.gov/servlet/surveyOutputServlet?jrunsessionid=1096866435715
206311 (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (showing that 1,310,000 private businesses
closed in 2003).
34. For a discussion of the make-up of the Chapter 11 docket in a typical
district, see Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical
Study of Small Business Bankruptcies (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago) (on file with author).
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bankruptcy judge takes longer to act because active criminal fraud
on the part of the debtor makes the business's true state harder to
discern.
The benchmark by which to judge the bankruptcy system in
small cases is not the sheer number of businesses saved, but their
Most important is
ability to sort effectively and quickly.
identifying those cases in which the debtor is only playing for time.
The evidence suggests that bankruptcy judges can do this job
Indeed, the data are consistent with the
exceedingly well.
this job as well as a
conjecture that bankruptcy judges perform 35
market actor subject to the same constraints.
Small businesses and failed real estate deals make up the
bulk of the Chapter 11 docket, but the megacases like Enron make
36
the headlines. Here too, Chapter 11 is performing a new role.
During the 1980s, nine of ten large businesses that entered
Chapter 11 followed the traditional pattern. While in Chapter 11,
the old managers would negotiate with the creditors and settle on
a plan of reorganization. After much give-and-take, the creditors
would approve the plan and the business would emerge intact. In
2002, this pattern had largely disappeared. Today, Chapter 11 is
often merely the forum in which a business is liquidated or merged
with or acquired by another. Alternatively, the bankruptcy judge
the major
merely puts in place a restructuring of debt 8 that
7
investors have settled upon outside of bankruptcy.
Of the large publicly traded firms that exited Chapter 11 in
2002, the assets of more than half were sold in Chapter 11 or were
38
In
transferred to a new owner under the plan of reorganization.
some cases, the sales are more or less completed before the fact,
and the Chapter 11 merely ensures that no one else will bid
more. 39 In other cases, the bankruptcy judge conducts an auction
in open court. Warren Buffet acquired Fruit of the Loom in this
However, the sale may involve more elaborate
fashion. 40
negotiations. Sterling Chemical sold half its assets in Chapter 11
and a third-party investor acquired control of what was left under

35. See id. at 7.
36. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002).
37. For an analysis of these changes in large Chapter 11 cases over the last
twenty years, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at
Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 674 (2003).
38. Id. at 675-76.
39. The sale of Budget to Avis is a representative example. See id. at 675
n.7.
40. Fruit of the Loom Sale ProcedureIs Given Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2001, at C4; Judge Approves Fruit of the Loom Recovery Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
April 4, 2002, at C4. See also DDJ Capital Mgmt, LLC v. Fruit of the Loom,
Inc. (In re Fruit of the Loom, Inc.), 274 B.R. 631, 634 (D. Del. 2002).
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a plan of reorganization.41 Of the large businesses whose assets
are not sold in Chapter 11, more than half enter Chapter 11 with a
prenegotiated plan.42 The judge usually confirms it within several
months after only minor modifications.4 3 The central issue in
these cases is valuation and bankruptcy judges approach this issue
with great sophistication and a faith in markets.
IV. REAL ESTATE BANKRUPTCY TODAY

What do these developments tell us about real estate
bankruptcy today?
The changes we have seen elsewhere in
bankruptcy reflect on increasing realism on the part of judges and
increasing attention to the realities of the market. Some might
argue that these all point in the direction of ridding ourselves of
real estate bankruptcies altogether. There is not the collective
action problem that justifies the reorganization process in the first
place. We have essentially a dispute between two people. We
have a secured creditor with a right to foreclose, bargained for in
advance, and we have an investor with a leaky tax shelter. For
one reason or another, they cannot agree on a restructuring
outside of bankruptcy.
They are both adults. The inability of two sophisticated
parties to reach a mutually beneficial bargain has few effects on
anyone else. If they can't reach a deal between themselves, why
should we shed any tears? The secured creditor forecloses, credit
bids, and takes the property. So what? To anyone who says that
the foreclosure process is inefficient and that is why we need
bankruptcy, I would say that bankruptcy is part of the problem.
There is no incentive to fix a bad foreclosure law if bankruptcy is
always there as a safety valve. The problem is a two-party
problem with local real estate law. We do not need a federal law to
handle it.
Real estate bankruptcy requires a leap of faith. But the new
breed of bankruptcy judges that we see in action in small and
large cases may give us a taste of what is to come. What is the
lesson that these small cases tell us about the future of real estate
bankruptcies? It is pretty simple. We have a hard time justifying
what the Bankruptcy Code does in small cases, but the response
from the bankruptcy judges is interesting and in a sense
predictable. They do not question the rationale for the law, but
they do insist that the small business that wants to reorganize
gets its act together. Bankruptcy is not the same as free parking.

41.

See STERLING CHEMS., INC., 10-Q QUARTERLY REPORT (Aug. 13, 2003),

available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1O14669/0009501290300
4147/0000950129-03-004147.txt.
42. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 37, at 678.
43. Id.

2004]

Remembering Pine Gate

You always have to be able to explain to the judge how you are
going to get from here to there. If you cannot, your case is going to
be dismissed, as long as someone remembers to make the proper
motion.
The lesson for real estate bankruptcies is clear. Bankruptcy
judges are not going to question the wisdom of having a real estate
bankruptcy in the first place. That is why they are judges and I
am an academic. But they do not have a lot of patience for losers
either. If you don't have an exit strategy, the modern bankruptcy
judge is going to show you the door.
The large cases provide a somewhat different lesson, one that
is more directly connected with real estate bankruptcies. The
basic message of the large cases is the way in which bankruptcy
judges are becoming more like Delaware chancellors. To put it
concretely, bankruptcy judges today have increasing sophistication
about valuation. The first question that today's judge would ask
about Pine Gate is the debtor's arithmetic.
If the bank is entitled to Blackacre, how can it be enough to
give the bank only part of the income stream that Blackacre is
going to generate over time? To say that Blackacre is worth $60,
is to say that its discounted cash flows from now until the end of
time are worth $60. If the bank is entitled to $60, giving it
anything less than all of Blackacre's future earnings is necessarily
undercompensatory. Things can, of course, get complicated. The
old limited partners may be willing to throw additional money in
the pot to ward off the tax collector. But the numbers have to add
up, and the days when bankruptcy judges could not do the math
are over. Their thumbs are not on the scale anymore.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, Pine Gate is bankruptcy's past, not its future. What
we shall see in the next round of real estate bankruptcies is going
to be different. The typical real estate bankruptcy will involve a
debtor and a real estate lender who face some complicated problem
that they have not been able to sort through in the time they had
outside of bankruptcy. The debtor will try to use the bankruptcy
forum in one last effort to sort things out. The bankruptcy judge
will give them some time to negotiate and provide a dose of reality
therapy in the process. But this window of opportunity will not
last long and the shadow that is cast by the realities of the market
will always be present. The days of Pine Gate are over.

